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Abstract. This paper studies the security level expected by the canon-
ical form of the Self-Synchronizing Stream Cipher (SSSC). A SSSC can
be viewed as the combination of a shift register together with a filter-
ing function. The maximum security of such a cipher is reached when
the filtering function is random. However, in practice, Pseudo Random
Functions (PRF) are used as filtering functions. In this case, we show
that the security against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA security)
cannot be reached for the canonical form of the SSSC, but it is how-
ever secure against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA secure). Then,
a weaker property than pseudo-randomness is introduced in order to
characterize the security of the canonical SSSC from its filtering func-
tion. A connection with the left-or-right indistinguishability (LOR-IND)
is made. This property provides a necessary and sufficient condition to
characterize the indistinguishablity of SSSC.
1 Introduction
Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers (SSSC) was patented in 1946. The basic prin-
ciple of such ciphers is to encrypt every plaintext symbol with a transformation
that only involves a fixed number of previous ciphertexts symbols. Therefore,
every ciphertext symbol is correctly decrypted provided that previous symbols
have been properly received. This self-synchronisation property has many advan-
tages and is especially relevant to group communications. In this respect, since
1960, specific SSSC have been designed and are still used to provide bulk encryp-
tion (for hertzian line, RNIS link, . . . ) in military applications or governmental
radio mobile network.
Regarding security, SSSC have intrinsic interesting properties due to the spe-
cific architecture. For example, as each plaintext symbol influences potentially all
subsequent ciphertexts, they naturally have good diffusion properties and are ef-
ficient against attacks based on plaintext redundancy. Furthermore, they can pre-
vent from traffic analysis as the information which is conveyed through the chan-
nel is encrypted whether there is traffic or not. In the early 90s, studies have been
2performed [Mau91,DGV92] to propose secure design of SSSC. These works have
been followed by effective constructions ([DGV92,Sar03,DK08]), but till now, all
of these SSSC schemes have been broken([JM03,JM05,JM06,KRB+08,Kl´ı05]),
what may make believe that a secure SSSC is impossible to design. In this paper,
we derive a result on the security of the canonical form of the Self-Synchronizing
Stream Cipher . Let us recall that the canonical form of the Self-Synchronizing
Stream Cipher (SSSC) is constituted by the combination of a shift register, which
acts as a state register with the ciphertext as input, together with a filtering
function that provides the running key stream. It had been shown in [BDM15]
that the canonical form of the Self-Synchronizing Stream Cipher is not resis-
tant against chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA security) but can reach the
resistance against chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA security) provided that
the filtering function is pseudo random. In this paper, a weaker property than
pseudo-randomness is introduced in order to characterize the security of the
canonical SSSC from its filtering function. A connection with the left-or-right
indistinguishability (LOR-IND) is made. This property provides a necessary and
sufficient condition to characterize the indistinguishablity of SSSC. The techni-
cal developments used to establish the security proof follow similar lines than
those used when dealing with block cipher symmetric encryption scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the characteristic of
the canonical form of SSSC. Sections 3 present various criteria on the filtering
function to guarantee the security of the SSSC. The notions of indistinguisha-
bility and security games, used to assess the security of the SSSC, are detailed
in Section 4. The results on the security are established in Section 5. Finally, we
end up with concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Canonical form of the Self-Synchronization Stream
Cipher
2.1 Generalities on SSSC
A conventional way for designing an SSSC is to resort to a shift-register-like ar-
chitecture, giving the so-called canonical representation of the SSSC [MvOV96].
This canonical representation is depicted in Figure 1. It has also been studied
in [Par12] and admits at the cipher and decipher sides the respective equations:
cipher:
{
zt = hκ(ct−1, . . . , ct−n)
ct = zt ⊕mt
decipher:
{
ẑt = hκ(ct−1, . . . , ct−n)
m̂t = ẑt ⊕ ct
(1)
where n is the dimension of the shift register, hκ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} denotes
the filtering function parametrized by the secret key κ and for all instant t, mt ∈
{0, 1} is the plaintext symbol, ct ∈ {0, 1} is the ciphertext symbol, zt ∈ {0, 1}
is the key stream symbol. The quantity ẑt ∈ {0, 1} is the key stream symbol on
the deciphering side and m̂t ∈ {0, 1} is the recovered plaintext symbol. NB: it is
3worth pointing out that all the results are established here in the Boolean case
but still hold when considering any other finite alphabet.































Fig. 1. Canonical form of a SSSC. Left: the ciphering. Right: the deciphering.
The secret key κ is some suitable parameters that select the function h among
a family of filtering functions. The dimension of the shift register is given by the
integer n. The key stream symbol zt is the output of the filtering function. It only
depends on the secret key κ shared by the cipher and the decipher and on n past
values of the ciphertext. The ciphertext ct is worked out from an exclusive or of
the plaintext symbol mt and of the key stream symbol zt. It is conveyed through
the public channel. Since the generator function h shares, at the transmitter and
receiver sides, the same values, namely the n past ciphertexts, then the receiver
recovers the plaintext when he properly received the last n ciphertext symbols.
Indeed m̂t = mt whenever ẑt = zt. Finally, the vector xt = (ct−1, . . . , ct−n)
stands for the internal state. Then, it is clear that the generators synchronize
automatically after a finite transient time of length n. As a result, the dimension
n of the shift register defines the synchronization delay of the decipher.
The SSSC model defined by equations (1) and shown on Figure 1 remains
a conceptual model that can be implemented by different architectures result-
ing from different design approaches. An overview has been given in [Dae95] and
more recently in the survey paper [MG10]. The so called Cipher Feedback (CFB)
mode of operation consists in building a closed-loop architecture involving both
a shift register and a block cipher primitive. The mostly adopted method to
implement a binary SSSC is to resort to a block cipher (AES for instance) in
1-bit CFB mode [oS80]. Nevertheless, this mode is quite inefficient in terms of
encryption speed since one block cipher operation is required for encrypting a
single plaintext bit. The state transition function is described by the shift reg-
ister. It is very simple and is secret key independent. Therefore, the security
relies entirely on the security of the filtering function. Maurer’s approach is sug-
gested in [Mau91] as an alternative. The most important concept is the use of
several finite state automata in parallel and serial combinations. However, it is
shown in [Dae95] that this method is not really relevant. In order to guarantee
the self-synchronization in finite-time, the state transitions functions proposed
in [Dae95] are the T–functions (T for Triangle), which are functions that prop-
4agate dependencies in one direction only. More general architectures having the
self-synchronization property have been proposed in [MG10][PGM11]. The con-
structions were based on advanced control theoretical concepts such as flatness.
2.2 Encryption/decryption mechanisms of SSSC
In order to assess the security level reached by the canonical SSSC, it is necessary
to formally define the encryption and the decryption mechanisms.
Setup A random secret key κ is randomly chosen in the key space for both the
cipher and the decipher.
Encryption For encrypting a message m consisting in ` binary symbols, the steps
are the following:
1. Choose randomly an n-dimensional binary vector as the initial state x0 of
the shift register.
2. Choose randomly n binary symbols to build the synchronization sequence
and concatenate it with the message to be encrypted yielding a binary se-
quence m0, . . . ,mn+`−1. The first n symbols are those of the synchronization
sequence, and the other ones are those of the message to be encrypted.
3. For each symbol at instant t,
(a) Compute the key stream symbol as zt = hκ(xt).
(b) Compute the ciphertext symbol as ct = mt ⊕ zt.
(c) Update the shift register state by shifting its components and feeding it
by the computed ciphertext symbol ct to obtain the next state xt+1.
Decryption For decrypting the cryptogram consisting in n + ` binary symbols,
the steps are the following:
1. Initialize the shift register state to any arbitrary value, for example the n-
dimensional zero vector x̂0 = 0.
2. For each symbol at instant t,
(a) Compute the key stream symbol as ẑt = hκ(x̂t).
(b) Compute the plaintext symbol as m̂t = ct ⊕ ẑt.
(c) Update the shift register state by shifting its components and feeding it
by the computed ciphertext symbol ct to obtain the next state xˆt+1.
3. The first n decrypted symbols correspond to the synchronization sequence
and are ignored. The decrypted message consists of the ` last decrypted
symbols.
3 Security criteria on the filtering function
In this section, we first recall what a pseudo random function is, and then we
define a new security criterion on the filtering function that characterizes the
security of the Self-Synchronizing Stream Cipher.
53.1 Pseudo Random Functions
A Pseudo Random Function is an element randomly chosen in a family of Pseudo
Random Functions. A family of functions is said to be Pseudo Random if it is
computationally indistinguishable from the set of all the functions. This means
that for polynomial complexity adversaries, a Pseudo Random Function behaves
as if it was a true randomly chosen function.
The Pseudo Random property is assessed by the so called PRF-game that
involves an adversary B, challenged to guess whether a given function is either
a true random function, randomly chosen in the set of all the functions, or is an
element of the family. The entries of the algorithm B are an integer n together
with an oracle that, on request for an n-dimensional vector, returns the value of
the function.
The PRF-game. The element of the game for the parameter n is a family of
functions fκ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The steps of the game are the followings:
1. The oracle chooses a random bit b ∈ {rf,prf}. If b = prf (pseudo random
world) then it randomly chooses a function f = fκ in the family of pseudo
random functions. If b = rf (random world), it randomly chooses a Boolean
function f in the set of all 22
n
Boolean functions {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
2. The challenger asks the oracle for the values of f(xi) for inputs x1, . . . , xq.
The number q of queries the challenger is allowed to perform is bounded by
a polynomial in n.
3. After the q queries, the challenger must answer a binary value b̂ that means
that the challenger guesses that the chosen function was pseudo random
(̂b = prf) or was purely random (̂b = rf). If b̂ = b then the challenger wins.
The adversary B does not know in which world it plays: pseudo random or
random world? Let Prprf(B = prf) be the probability that B answers prf given it
plays in the pseudo random world and let Prrf(B = prf) be the probability that
B answers prf given it plays in the random world. In the first case, the answer
of B is correct, and in the second case, it is wrong. The advantage of B in the
PRF-game is by definition:
Advprf(B) =
∣∣∣Prprf(B = prf)− Prrf(B = prf)∣∣∣
A family of Boolean functions is said to be pseudo random (PRF) if the
maximum advantage of any adversary is negligible.
N.B. For a family of functions to be PRF, it is necessary that its number of
elements increases faster than any polynomial in the security parameter n. If not,
the exhaustive search algorithm has polynomial complexity. In cryptographic
context, the key secret selects an element of the family. So, the key size must be
greater than the logarithm of any power of n. In practice, an n-bit long key is
admissible.
63.2 Weak Pseudo Random Functions
In this section, we define a new family of functions with a weaker property
than pseudo random functions defined in the previous section and that is more
suitable to assess the security of Self Synchronizing Stream Ciphers.
A Weak Pseudo Random Function, wprf for short, is an element of a family
of weak pseudo random functions. Such a family is computationally indistin-
guishable from the family of all function. The wprf property is defined by the so
called wprf-game defined further.
Given a prf-family, the wprf-game challenger is challenged to guess whether
a given function presented to it is either an element of the family or a random
function. In order to answer the challenge, the challenger can ask for help from
an oracle. The difference with prf-families lies in the form of the requests to the
oracle.
The WPRF-game. The element of the game for the parameter n is a family of
functions fκ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The steps of the game are the following.
1. The oracle chooses a random bit b ∈ {rf,wprf}. If b = rf, then it randomly
chooses a function in the set of all 22
n
functions {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Otherwise,
if b = wprf, then it chooses a random parameter κ that defines a random
element f = fκ of the WPRF-family. The oracle keeps the chosen bit secret
and the goal of the challenger is to guess it.
2. The challenger asks the oracle for responses to requests. The input of the
request is a polynomial length string of bits m1 · · ·mk. The response of the





x0 is chosen at random by the oracle





and x << 1 denotes the left shift of the binary vector x by one.
3. After a polynomial number q of queries, the challenger answers a binary
value b̂ ∈ {rf,wprf} which means that the function f chosen by the oracle is
either random or pseudo random.
Remark 1. The sequence of couples transmitted by the oracle at the step 2
corresponds exactly to the parameters and the values of the canonical SSSC
filtering function during the encryption process of the message m. Given this
sequence, the cryptogram is deduced by:
ci = mi ⊕ f(xi).
Conversely, knowing the cryptogram of a given message, it is possible to infer
the sequence transmitted by the oracle. The parameter xi consists in the vector
whose components are the latter cryptogram symbols and the value is given by:
f(xi) = ci ⊕mi.
7Remark 2. As the initial value is randomly chosen by the oracle, the challenger
cannot predict which parameters xi will be returned by the oracle.
The advantage of a challenger B in a wprf game is defined in the same manner
as in the prf game:
Advwprf(B) =
∣∣∣Prwprf(B = wprf)− Prrf(B = prf)∣∣∣.
3.3 Pseudo random functions are weak pseudo random functions
Proposition 1. If a family of functions is pseudo random, then it is weak
pseudo random.
Proof. Given a family of functions F , one has to prove that if a challenger
against the weak pseudo random property of F exists, then a challenger against
the pseudo random property can be derived.
Let B a challenger against the weak pseudo random property. We construct a
challenger A against the pseudo random property, that will act for B as a weak
pseudo random oracle. The precise definition of A is:
1. On request of a length k sequence m1 · · ·mk from B, the challenger A chooses
a random value x0 ∈ {0, 1}n, computes x1, . . . , xk as xi = (xi−1 << 1) +mi,
asks the oracle for the values f(xi) and transmits them to B.
2. After a polynomial number q of such queries, the challenger B answers. If B
answers rf, then A answers rf, and if B answers wprf, then A answers prf.
We now prove that the challenger A so constructed has the same advantage as
the challenger B. This follows from the fact that the challenger A gives the same
answer as B. Thus A wins at the same time as B. And yet as A acts for B as
a wprf oracle, one has Prprf(A = prf) = Prwprf(B = wprf) and Prrf(A = rf) =
Prrf(B = rf). It follows that Advprf(A) = Advwprf(B), and then, if B has a non
negligible wprf-advantage, then A has a non negligible prf-advantage too.
4 Indistinguishability and security games
The framework used here to assess the security of SSSC is the one defined in
[BR05] for symmetric encryption schemes. The notions of security games is used
within this framework. They are based on security concepts introduced by Gold-
wasser and Micali [GM82,GM84]. The first concept is the semantic security,
which is a computational analogue to the Shannon perfect secrecy. It means
that an adversary cannot recover any bit of information of the plaintext from
the ciphertext. However, the semantic security does not allow to fluently deal
with security proof. This leads the authors in [GM82,GM84] to define another
concept known as indistinguishability which better facilitates proving the secu-
rity of practical ciphers.
In order to characterize the security of the SSSC, we need a variant of the in-
distinguishability property known as the left-or-right indistinguishability which
imply the indistinguishability property against an adaptive chosen plaintext at-
tack.
84.1 Indistinguishability and IND-game
A cryptographic scheme is said to be secure, in the sense of indistinguishability,
if a polynomial complexity algorithm has a negligible advantage in distinguishing
from which of two messages m0 and m1 it has provided, comes the cryptogram
presented to it. This is formalized by the so called IND-game. This game involves
two players: an algorithm A called adversary or challenger, and an oracle. The
game consists of the following steps:
1. The challenger chooses two messages m0 and m1 and provides the oracle
with them.
2. The oracle randomly chooses a binary digit b ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts the message
mb and returns the cryptogram to the challenger.
3. The challenger is challenged to guess the value of b, that is which of the two
messages has been encrypted. The answer of the challenger is a binary value
b̂. The challenger wins if b = b̂.
Before giving its answer, the challenger can be supported by the oracle to
decrypt ciphertexts the challenger chooses (Chosen Ciphertext Attack, CCA) or
to encrypt plaintexts the challenger chooses (Chosen plaintext Attack, CPA). Of
course, in a CCA attack, the challenger is not allowed to request the decryption
of the challenge it has received.
For any b and b̂ in the set {0, 1}, let Prmb(A = b̂) be the probability that the
challenger A answers b̂ given the ciphertext which corresponds to the encryption
of the message mb. The advantage of A in this IND-game is by definition:
Adv(A) =
∣∣∣Prm0(A = 0)− Prm1(A = 0)∣∣∣.
As m0 and m1 are randomly chosen with the same probability 1/2, it holds
that
Adv(A) =
∣∣∣2Pr(b = b̂)− 1∣∣∣,
where Pr(b = b̂) denotes the probability that A wins.
If the challenger answers at random, then its advantage is null. If it always
wins, or always looses, then its advantage equals 1.
A cryptographic scheme is defined by a security parameter, which is for
example the key size. Such a scheme is said to be IND-secure if the advantage
of the challenger is negligible. A function of the real number x is said to be
negligible if it decreases faster that the inverse of any polynomial in x as x
grows to infinity. A cryptographic algorithm is said to be IND-CCA if it is IND-
secure during a CCA attack. It is said to be IND-CPA if it is IND-secure during
a CPA attack.
For the canonical SSSC, the security parameters are the size of the shift
register which equals the number of inputs of the filtering function and the size
of the secret key.
94.2 Left-or-right indistinguishability and LOR-IND-game
Likewise the IND-game, the LOR-IND-game, namely left-or-right indistinguisha-
bility is described in [BDJR97]. It involves two algorithms: the challenger A and
an oracle. The game consists in the following steps:
1. First, the oracle randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. The challenger sends to the oracle a polynomial number of queries in the form
of couples of messages (mi0,m
i
1). The oracle encrypts either the message m
i
0
or the message mi1 depending on the bit b chosen during the step 1. It returns
to the challenger the cryptogram ci of the message mib.
3. After a polynomial number of queries, the challenger is challenged to guess
the value of the bit b chosen by the oracle. The response of the challenger is
a binary value b̂ ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger wins if b = b̂.
Likewise the IND-game, the advantage of a challenger A in the LOR-IND-
game is defined by:
Adv(A) = ∣∣Prb=0(A = 0)− Prb=1(A = 0)∣∣
=
∣∣2 Pr(b = b̂)− 1∣∣
A ciphering scheme is said to have the LOR-IND property if any polynomial
adversary has a negligible advantage in the LOR-IND-game.
The following proposition states that the left-or-right indistinguishability in-
troduced above is a stronger property that the indistinguishability against a
chosen plaintext attack.
Proposition 2. If a ciphering scheme reaches the LOR-IND-CPA property,
then it reaches the IND-CPA property.
Proof. By contraposition, assume that a challenger A against the IND-CPA
property exists. A challenger B against the LOR-IND property is constructed
from A:
1. The challenger A chooses a first couple of messages (m00,m01) that it sends
to B, and B sends directly theses messages to the LOR-IND oracle.
2. When A requires for the cryptograms of a chosen plaintext message mi, the
algorithm B sends to the LOR-IND-oracle the couple with twice the same
message : (mi,mi). The cryptogram returned by the oracle thus corresponds
to mi whatever the random bit b chosen by the oracle. This cryptogram is
returned to A.
3. After a polynomial number of queries, the challenger A returns a guess b̂ for
b, and B returns the same value.
The algorithm B so defined simulates for A an IND-CPA-oracle, and the
advantage of B equals the advantage of A. Thus, if an adversary against the
IND-CPA property exists, then an adversary against the LOR-IND property
exists too. By contraposition, if the ciphering scheme is LOR-IND-CPA secure,
then it is IND-CPA secure.
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In [BDJR97], it has been shown that LOR-IND security is in fact equivalent
to IND security, under the condition to increase the number of requests to the
oracle.
5 Security proof of the canonical SSSC
5.1 IND-CCA security of the canonical SSSC
The ideal case for a canonical SSSC is when the filtering function is randomly
chosen among all the 22
n
Boolean functions. This ideal case is not realistic as
it would imply an exponential key size. However, even in this situation, the
following property holds:
Proposition 3. The canonical SSSC cannot reach the IND-CCA security
Proof. Consider the special situation when the challenger provides m0 = 0 · · · 0,
the message that only involves symbols 0, and m1 = 1 · · · 1, the message that
only involves symbols 1. It receives a cryptogram c. It modifies only the last
symbol of the cryptogram and asks the oracle to decrypt. If the answer of the
oracle starts with a sequence of 0, then c is the encryption of m0 and if it starts
with a sequence of 1, then c is the encryption of m1. Following this strategy, the
challenger always wins. That suffices to complete the proof.
Actually, this is due to the fact that the cryptograms produced by an SSSC
are malleable. Indeed, they can be modified at their end without effect on the
beginning of the plaintext.
The only security level that can be expected for the canonical SSSC is the
IND-CPA as shown in next section.
5.2 IND-CPA security of the canonical SSSC
The main result of this section is to prove that the wprf property of the filtering
function characterizes the IND-CPA security of the canonical SSSC.
Proposition 4. A canonical SSSC reaches the LOR-IND security if and only
if the filtering functions is wprf.
Proof. We first prove that if the filtering function of a canonical SSSC is wprf,
then the SSSC reaches the LOR-IND security. In order to prove this property,
we prove that if a polynomial adversary A exists against the SSSC, then we can
deduce a challenger B against the wprf property of the filtering function. Let B
be defined as follow:
1. B chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. For each received couple of messages (mi0,m
i
1), the simulator B requests for







. From this sequence, B computes a cryptogram c it
sends to A.
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3. After a polynomial times of queries, the adversary A answers a bit b̂ ∈ {0, 1}.
If b = b̂ then B answers wprf, and if b 6= b̂ then it answers rf.
It must be shown that if the advantage of A is non negligible, then the
advantage of B is non negligible too. From the definition of B, its advantage is:
Adv(B) = ∣∣Prwprf(b = b̂)− Prrf(b = b̂)∣∣.
In the wprf world, the challenger B acts for A as a true ciphering oracle. Thus,
the advantage of A is:
Adv(A) = ∣∣2Prwprf(b = b̂)− 1∣∣
≤ ∣∣2Prwprf(b = b̂)− 2Prrf(b = b̂)∣∣+ ∣∣2Prrf(b = b̂)− 1∣∣ (2)
The first term is twice the advantage of B. Moreover, as in the random world, the
answers of the wprf oracle are random, the answers of B to A are random too.
In consequence, the answer of B is random and the second term in the second
member of inequality (2) is null. It follows that:
Adv(A) ≤ 2Adv(B),
which proves the expected result.
It remains to prove the reciprocal: if the canonical SSSC reaches the LOR-
IND-CPA security, then the filtering function achieves the wprf property. By
contraposition, it is equivalent to prove that if a wprf challenger exists against
the filtering function, then a LOR-IND adversary can be constructed against the
canonical SSSC.
Given a wprf challenger B, then a LOR-IND adversary is constructed as
follow:
1. On each query mi from challenger B, the adversary A generates a random
binary sequence ai and sends to the LOR-IND oracle the couple (mi, ai).
2. The oracle encrypts either mi or ai according to the value of a random bit
b ∈ {0, 1} chosen once for all. The oracle returns to A the corresponding
cryptogram ci.
3. From the received cryptogram ci, the adversary A computes the values of the
filtering functions used by the oracle, assuming that the oracle has encrypted







4. After a polynomial number of queries, the challenger B returns an answer:
rf or wprf. If B answers wprf, then A returns b̂ = 0 and if B answers rf, then
A returns b̂ = 1.
If the LOR-IND oracle chooses b = 0, then its answers to B correspond to
the encryption of the binary sequences provided by A, and B simulates to A
an oracle in the wprf world. Conversely, if the LOR-IND oracle chooses b = 1,
and as the sequences ai are random, B simulates to A an oracle in the rf world.
In consequence, the advantage of B equals exactly the advantage of A and that
achieves the proof.
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From the above propositions, the following result holds:
Corollary 1. If the filtering function of a canonical SSSC is prf, then it achieves
the IND-CPA security.
Proof. Assume that the filtering function of a canonical SSSC is prf. From Propo-
sition 1, it is wprf. From Proposition 4, the canonical SSSC also achieves the
LOR-IND security, and finally, from Proposition 2, it achieves the IND-CPA
security too. This is summarized by the following implications:
prf ⇒ wprf ⇔ LOR-IND-CPA⇒ IND-CPA
6 Concluding remarks
The cryptological complexity of the canonical form of the Self-Synchronizing
Stream Cipher lies in the filtering function. The maximum security is achieved
when this function is a pure random function. It has been shown in this paper
that, even in this ideal case, this kind of cipher cannot reach the IND-CCA
security. This is due to the fact that the ciphertexts are malleable. Thus, the
maximum expected security is IND-CPA. In realistic implementation, the filter-
ing is a pseudo random function, for example a single output of a block cipher
primitive. We have proved that for such practical ciphers, the IND-CPA secu-
rity can be guaranteed. The interest of the result lies in that it guarantees the
existence of SSSC that can be IND-CPA secure although till now, the SSSC
proposed in the open literature had be broken against IND-CPA attacks.
Finally, a weaker property than pseudo-randomness has been proposed. It
had been called wprf. It allows to assess a stronger security level than indis-
tinguishability, mainly left-or-right indistinguishability, against chosen plaintext
attacks. Insofar as the IND-CPA of the canonical SSSC was an open problem for
a long times, we think that the result of this paper will be a further motivation
to consider new searches of secure designs of SSSC.
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